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Executive Summary
Prior research on health insurance expansions has ignored the content
of coverage, yet the nature of coverage offered is likely to affect both
take-up by the uninsured and the public policyrelevant consequences
of the expansion. This paper uses the Medical Expenditure Panel Sur-
vey, the Survey of Program Dynamics, and the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment to show that uninsured people are likely to value certain
types of coverage more than others. Using a simulation model of the
value of coverage expansions, I show that front-end coverage with
a low-benefit maximum is likely to be perceived as more valuable
than catastrophic coverage by low-income uninsured people. Some
high-deductible coverage may make uninsured people subjectively
worse off.
I.Introduction
Economic research on health insurance has focused on three questions.
One line of research examines the extent of moral hazard in health
insurance and assesses the effect of health insurance on service utiliza-
tion. Research in this area takes careful account of the parameters of
health insurance contracts. For example, the RAND experiment evalu-
ated the effects of varying co-insurance and deductible levels on health
service utilization (Newhouse 1993). A second line of research mea-
sures the extent of adverse selection among health insurance offerings
for a given population This work typically incorporates some measures
of the generosity of insurance coverage, such as the actuarial value of
coverage or the nature of coverage. For example, Price and Mays (1985)56 Glied
show that, within the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,
purchasers of standard option coverage are, on average, healthier than
those who purchase high-option coverage. Similarly, Brown et al.
(1993) show that Medicare beneficiaries who join health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) are, on average, healthier than those who re-
main in the traditional program. Finally, a third area of research as-
sesses the factors that affect the decision to purchase health insurance
at all. Research in this area usually treats coverage as a categorical vari-
ableat any moment in time, people hold either public or private in-
surance or they are uninsured. For example, Gruber and Poterba (1994)
show that a change in the tax treatment of health insurance purchases
by the self-employed led to an increase in health insurance coverage
in this group.
Following this last literature, estimates of the costs and consequences
of proposals to expand health insurance coverage generally treat insur-
ance as a categorical variable. This categorical treatment is a natural
corollary of the way that individual insurance coverage is measured
in almost every available national survey. The decision to treat insur-
ance as categorical is also consistent with an individual health insur-
ance choice market where consumers select between no coverage and
the optimal level of health insurance. As Pauly and Herring (2002) indi-
cate, however, this convention may not be appropriate in assessing
group coverage. Finkelstein (2002) shows that this assumption is also
not appropriate in the Medigap coverage market, where the content of
coverage is regulated. In this chapter, I show that the categorical treat-
ment of insurance coverage may also be inappropriate for assessing
incremental policies that aim to expand coverage further.
The categorical treatment of health insurance fails to consider two
critical elements in voluntary, incremental health insurance expansion
proposals. First, in a voluntary expansion, people must take up the
coverage that is offered to them. Basic microeconomic theory says that
what people like best is money, which they can spend according to
their own preferences. It follows that if health insurance, not money,
is to be redistributed, the more flexible the available benefits, the higher
the participation rate will be (see Finkelstein 2002, for example). If ben-
efit design is specified in some way, however, the specifics of that de-
sign are likely to affect participation.
Second, categorical treatment does not take into account the ration-
ale for expanding health insurance coverage. There are three plausible
reasons for expanding health care coverage: "Lacking insurance is aHealth Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 57
problem for individuals because too often, no health insurance means
health care foregone, small warning signs ignored, and minor illnesses
allowed to become costly crises. It's a problem for families because
unpaid medical bills are a leading cause of personal bankruptcy. And
it's a problem for the nation because uncompensated care is an unfair
burden on doctors, hospitals, and taxpayers." That is, health insurance
may (a) increase access to health care services, (b) provide people with
financial protection in lieu of bankruptcy, and (c) improve the effi-
ciency with which existing care is delivered. The extent to which a
given expansion accomplishes these goals will depend critically on the
nature of the coverage that people obtain. Beyond these goals, there
may be other public policy concerns in relation to the content of cover-
age. For example, it may be desirable that new insurance expansions
mesh well with existing health insurance programs. It may also be de-
sirable that new expansions not encourage those who already hold cov-
erage to switch. Categorical treatment of health insurance in modeling
coverage expansions obscures the tensions between these two ele-
ments. The types of coverage that uninsured people would most likely
prefer and would choose if given perfectly flexible benefit choice need
not correspond to these public policy goals.
This paper has five parts. The first part describes how the decision
to purchase health insurance coverage is treated in existing models of
coverage expansions and illustrates the range of possible health insur-
ance packages that might be available under a coverage expansion. The
second part provides theoretical and empirical evidence showing that
the content of health insurance coverage is likely to affect the fraction
of uninsured people who take up coverage that is offered. The third
part provides empirical evidence that different types of coverage will
have distinct public policy consequences. The fourth section of the pa-
per illustrates the likely consequences of two different health insurance
packages. The final section provides a conclusion.
II.The Treatment of Health Insurance Purchasing in Existing
Models
There are three types of models used to simulate the effects of ex-
panding insurance coverage. The first type of model applies price elas-
ticities to data on current prices and current insurance patterns (Gruber
2000, Baumgardner 1998, Custer and Wildsmith 1999). The price elas-
ticities employed in this approach come from the existing literature.58 Glied
Three recent studies examine the price elasticity of health insurance
purchase in the context of three different markets (Marquis and Long
1999, Gruber and Poterba 1994, Royalty 2000). Marquis and Long (1999)
rely on variation in the price of health insurance in the nongroup mar-
ket to identify the price elasticity of demand for nongroup coverage.
Gruber and Poterba (1994) use a natural experiment, the extension of
a new tax exemption of 25 percent of the cost of coverage for the self-
employed, to measure the price elasticity of demand for individual cov-
erage. Royalty (2000) take advantage of naturally occurring variation
in the tax price of health insurance across states to measure the price
elasticity of demand for private coverage. All three of these studies
define insurance, within the market they are examining, as a binary
(yes / no) variable.
A second approach applies estimates of the rate at which people take
up coverage to groups of individuals defined by particular characteris-
tics such as income and family size. Some of these estimates incorpo-
rate the price of coverage as a grouping category (for example, see
Holahan, Uccello, and Feder 1999). This approach has primarily been
used for Medicaid take-up calculations. These models use data from
large national surveys, such as the Current Population Survey, that
define health insurance categorically. These models, too, examine a bi-
nary decision (whether or not to take up Medicaid coverage).
The third approach compares new health insurance options with es-
timated reservation prices (Pauly and Herring 2001). A reservation
price is the highest price at which a given individual would purchase
health insurance. The most common implementation of this method
utilizes discrete choice model estimation. This method again relies on
standard national data sets that include only categorical measures of
insurance coverage. Another less frequently used implementation in-
corporates more structural methods based on utility functions (Zabin-
ski et al. 1999, Pauly and Herring 2001). In Pauly and Herring's (2001)
implementation, the reservation price of health insurance coverage is
estimated using information on actual health insurance expenditures
and the availability of uncompensated care. Even in this model,
though, health insurance coverage itself is treated only as a binary
variable.
When any of these models are implemented, researchers must com-
pare the price of coverage that is currently available to people with the
price of coverage that would be available after a reform. When doing
so, researchers must explicitly define coverage in any of these models.Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 59
In most models, coverage is defined as any insurance package of a
specified actuarial value.
Health insuranceeven insurance of a given actuarial value
comes in many flavors. Expansion of private health insurance maybe
expected to lead to even more coverage innovation, with a still wider
range of products available, including productsthat cater to the partic-
ular demands of the newly covered consumers. Coverage expansions
may also take the form of Medicaid eligibilityextensions. Medicaid
offers a particular type of insurance coverage that is different from
coverage offered in the private, nongroup market. In practice,modelers
generally examine take-up of either a Medicaid coverage expansion or
a tax credit for the purchase of private, nongroup coverage.They do
not attempt to reconcile take-up propensities explicitly for these two
alternative policies, making it difficult to compare these approaches.
Health insurance products may vary in overall generosity (actuarial
value) and in benefit design within a given actuarial value category.
Table 3.1 focuses on models that differ only in benefit design. Even
within a given price range, under identical underwriting conditions, a
wide range of packages exist. Table 3.1 presents benefit packages that
Table 3.1



















































'Glied, Callahan, Mays, and Edwards 2002.
provided by Actuarial Research Consulting 2002.
'Based on average Medicaid per-capita payment of $1,876 per adult served in 1998
(http: / /hcfa.gov / stats/2Tchartbk.pdf).60 Glied
are all estimated to cost about $1,450 after loading in the individual
insurance market for an average uninsured purchaser.
These packages provide very different types of protection. The high
deductible policy offers catastrophic protection but encourages little
new service use. The front-end package prepays most routine health
service costs but provides very little catastrophic protection. The bare-
bones package offers both substantial front-end coverage and cata-
strophic protectionas long as the insured person does not need either
prescriptions or mental health coverage. The Medicaid package pro-
vides very complete, generous coverage but relies on a highly restricted
set of providers.
A further distinction between private nongroup, private group and
public coverage is in the timing of available coverage. Two aspects of
timing may be important: the timing of coverage for routine care and
the timing of coverage for serious illness. An application for coverage
in the nongroup market can be made at any time. Coverage for routine
care in this market usually begins 4 to 8 weeks after an application is
submitted, taking into account the time for underwriter approval of
the applicationa process that may take 2 to 6 weeks.2 Coverage in
the nongroup market generally excludes pre-existing conditions, some-
times permanently, so coverage for serious illness must be purchased
before the illness occurs. In the employer market, people can signup
for coverage only during predefined enrollment periods. Coverage
generally begins within a month of enrollment. In this market, there
are often temporary limits on coverage for pre-existing conditions (for
those who were previously uninsured). Finally, Medicaid program
rules require that a Medicaid card, providing access tocoverage for
routine care, must be extended within forty-five days of receipt ofa
completed application based on nondisability related eligibility and 90
days for disability-related eligibility (42 C.F.R. § 435.912). Coverage for
serious illness, however, is much easier to obtain through Medicaid.
Medicaid (and State Children's Health Insurance Program [S-CHIP])
ignores pre-existing conditions. For those with a serious illness, cover-
age under the Medicaid program can extend three months retroac-
tively, in principle. Patients can be enrolled in hospital by the provider
institution after they become ill. These provisions imply that all those
eligible for Medicaid implicitly have "conditional" health insurance
coverage for serious illness, though not for routine care (Cutler and
Gruber 1996).Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 61
Differences in content and timing of available health care benefits
mean that different packages are likely to attract different groupsof
consumers. These features of the packages also have different public
policy implications.
III.What Uninsured People Want
One of the disappointing findings of the literature on health insurance
expansions is the limited number of people who might be expected to
participate in a program. The literature on the Medicaid expansions of
the late 1980s and early 1990s suggests that the program, which offered
free insurance coverage to low-income children, enticed less than two-
thirds of uninsured, eligible children to participate. The SCHIP ex-
pansions since the mid-1990s offer free or very low-cost coverage to
near-poor children. The SCHIP expansions typically require far fewer
administrative hurdles than Medicaid and generally offer enrollees a
broader provider panel. Extensive outreach efforts have been made to
locate and enroll eligibles. Yet even here, estimates suggest that 26 per-
cent of uninsured children are eligible for SCHIP but have not enrolled
(Kenney and Haley 2001).
Estimates of responsiveness to tax credits that would substantially
reduce the price of insurance for the uninsured similarly suggest that
very large declines in price would be needed to capture asubstantial
share of the population. Estimates suggest that even a generous tax
credit that covered the full average cost of health insurance would re-
duce the number of uninsured by only about 30 percent (Gruber and
Levitt 2000).
A large, mainly qualitative literature attempts to explain why people
who are eligible for low-cost coverage do not sign up (Kenney and
Haley 2001). In a recent survey of families in which eligible children
were not enrolled in Medicaid / SCHIP, Keriney andHaley (2001)
found that among the 88 percent of families who were aware of the
programs, the most common reason recorded for not inquiring about
enrollment (40 percent) was that the families did not need or want the
coverage that was available.3
A basic assumption behind the categorical treatment of health insur-
ance coverage is that people who choose to purchase insurance can,
in a competitive market, with full information, select the package of
coverage that is best for them. Coverage has multiple dimensions and62 Glied
purchasers may choose combinations of these dimensions of coverage.
Uninsured people, however, have chosen not to purchase any of the
existing packages of coverage available. They are at a corner solution
along every dimension of purchased coverage. Suppose this group is
given a voucher that can be used only toward the purchase of health
insurance. There is no information in their current choice of coverage
that could guide us in guessing what combination of coverage dimen-
sions they would choose. In particular, there is no a priori reason to
expect them to select the same package that comparable insured people
are now purchasing.
Financing of Care
Uninsured people use less care than insured people do. Despite their
lack of insurance coverage, however, uninsured people do not pay for
all the care they do receive. The ratio of expenditures by the uninsured
compared to the privately insured declined very slightly in 1996 rela-
tive to 1987 (Taylor, Cohen, and Machlin 2001). The amount and share
paid by uninsured people themselves, however, has also fallen. The
remainder is paid by other sources, including uncompensated care.4
Some evidence suggests that the availability of uncompensated care,
in the form of public hospitals, may affect take-up of coverage, al-
though the effects are relatively small (Rask and Rask 2000). Some prior
research on take-up of coverage by the uninsured has taken this type
of effect into account (Pauly and Herring 2001). Pauly and Herring
estimate the level of uncompensated care that might be available to an
individual and the value that people with different characteristics
might place on using such care to compute the reservation price of
health insurance. This is an important step forward.
Pauly and Herring (2001) and Rask and Rask (2000), however, treat
all uncompensated care as equivalent. In fact, patterns of uncompen-
sated care may vary by service type and level of spending. For exam-
ple, nonprofit hospitals may provide low-cost or free services as a
component of charity care. Outpatient physician and dental services,
and prescription drugs may be more difficult to obtain at discounted
cost.
We use the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to exam-
ine patterns of financial exposure for different types of care. We exam-
ine the level and share of expenditures within service type that are
paid by people who are uninsured all year. We compare these sharesHealth Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 63
Table 3.2
Expenses by poverty and insurance
Table 3.3
Out-of-pocket by poverty and insurance
Source: MEPS, 1996.
Introduction to MEPS Data & Publications June 2002. Agency for Healthcare Researth
and Quality, Rockville, MD.
http: / /www.meps.ahrq.gov/ data_public.htm.
for the low-income (<200 percent FPL) and higher-income aninsured.
For completeness, we also report similar figures for people with non-
group coverage, employer-sponsored private coverage, and Medicaid
(<200 percent FPL only). The results are in tables 3.2 through 3.5.
As might be expected, people without health care coverage use sub-
stantially fewer services than do those with coverage. Among those








Uninsured 1,874 $465 10.8 5.6
Medicaid 1,691 $1,713 26.1 17
Private group 1,585 $1,422 27.1 15.7
Private nongroup 132 $2,726 33.1 22.5
>200% FPL
Uninsured 1,049 $655 11.7 5.5
Private group 8,226 $1,783 32.5 18.2









Uninsured 76.5 6 2.3
Medicaid 8.6 1.7 0.4
Private group 36.1 6.1 1.4
Private nongroup 51.1 15.3 5.2
>200% FPL
Uninsured 77.6 11.7 5.5
Private group 35.1 7.8 2.7
Private nongroup 57.9 14.5 6.864 Glied
Table 3.4
Out-of-pocket by poverty, insurance, and service type among those with expense
health care spending. The figure was comparable among those with
nongroup coverage. By contrast, fewer than 6 percent of the uninsured
exceeded $2,000 in annual health care spending. In addition, within
that spending, out-of-pocket financial exposure differed substantially
among the groups
In the MEPS sample, only 47 percent of uninsured people with in-
comes below 200 percent FPL and who had total spending over $2,000
spent as much as half that amount out-of-pocket. Low-income unin-
sured people paid 92 percent of their drug bills but only 47 percent
of their hospital bills. The results were not much different for higher-
income uninsured people. On average, uninsured people within a
given income range were less likely to spend more than $1,000 (or more
than $2,000) out-of-pocket than were their counterparts with nongroup
coverage.
Out-of-pocket shares of spending tended to decline with the level of
spending for all groups. Uninsured low-income people paid 86 percent
of the first $100 in spending out-of-pocket, but only two-thirds of spend-
ing between $500 and $2,000 and 43 percent of spending over $2,000.
There is substantial variation around the share of spending by unin-
sured people. While the average low-income uninsured person with
expenses over $500 paid only 65 percent of health care bills out-of-
pocket, 45 percent paid more than 90 percent of expenses out-of-pocket
and one-quarter paid less than one-third of their costs out-of-pocket.
Finally, some low-income uninsured people became covered by
Medicaid over the course of a year. For this group, overall spending
was much higher (12 percent had spending over $2,000) but the out-
of-pocket share of spending was much lower.
Hospital Office-Based Prescription
<200% FPL
Uninsured 46.6 74.6 91.6
Medicaid 1.8 4 21.1
Private group 15.8 34.9 51.1
Private nongroup 19.8 52.3 66.6
>200% FPL
Uninsured 42.5 73.2 87.9
Private group 15.7 32.3 49.7











































































































































































































































































































































































These patterns of spending suggest that uninsured people have some
de facto insurance coverage available to them through the uncompen-
sated care system and Medicaid conditional coverage. This "coverage,"
however, takes particular forms. Uninsured people pay almost all the
costs of up-front care, but less of the cost of high-end care. From the
perspective of out-of-pocket medical spending, the existing structure
of uncompensated care behaves like a high-deductible insurance poi-
icy. In addition, providers may not offer as much costly care to those
who cannot pay as they would to someone with a high-deductible in-
surance policy (Doyle 2001).
This pattern of de facto coverage has implications for the take-up of
actual coverage. Coverage with very high deductibles would, in effect,
mimic the nature of coverage that the uninsured already have. Thus,
such coverage is unlikely to be attractive to them. By contrast, coverage
that offers front-end protection is likely to be attractive to low-income
uninsured people because it provides them with services that they
would otherwise have to pay for entirely out-of-pocket. The desirabil-
ity of bare-bones coverage would depend on the extent to which ser-
vices are not available through alternative financing channels.
IV.What We Want the Uninsured to Have
Economists have always had difficulty analyzing in-kind transfer pro-
grams (Tobin 1970). Health insurance is no exception. Expansions of
health insurance coverage intend to do more than simply make the
uninsured better off. That goal could be accomplished more readily
by simply redistributing income. Although affordability is always the
leading reason cited by the uninsured for not buying coverage, income
transfers alone are unlikely to lead to a substantial increase in the level
of coverage.
The limitations of income transfers are apparent in analyses of the
effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on health insurance
purchase. Very few recipients of the EITC report that they used their
refund checks to purchase nongroup health insurance coverage
(Smeeding 2002). Some EITC recipients did respond to the combination
of income transfers and high marginal tax rates generated by the pro-
gram by taking up employer-sponsored health insurance (Baughman
2001). Baughman estimates, however, that less than 4 percent of EITC
spending went toward the purchase of health insurance coverage.Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 67
Health insurance expansions, then, intend to encourage uninsured
people to behave in ways that do not necessarily maximize their subjec-
tive utility but rather address specific public-policy objectives. Three
such objectives have been suggested: increasing health service use, pro-
viding financial asset protection in lieu of bankruptcy, and reducing
uncompensated care.
I will focus below on the first two of these goals, which are in ten-
sion.5 The theory of insurance, which underlies the second goal, sug-
gests that optimal coverage balances the benefits of financial protection
against the costs of insurance-induced service use (moral hazard).
Thus, optimal financial protection coverage is coverage that does not
induce any new service use, except to the extent that is consistent with
income transfers to people when they get sick (Nyman 2001). By con-
trast, the first goal aims to generate insurance-induced service use.
Economists have no specialized knowledge with which to decide be-
tween these goals.
Increasing Health Service Use
There are many kinds of health services. Health services vary in their
effects on health, in their effects on future service use, and in their
perceived benefits to the person being treated. Presumably, even those
who would like health insurance coverage expansions to increase ser-
vice use do not desire indiscriminate use of health services. The goal
of health coverage expansion is to generate more beneficial service use.
It is difficult to target use to appropriate care seeking through benefit
design. Health insurance is only one element in the process generating
care seeking and receipt. For example, in the RAND experiment, re-
searchers found that one of the few health conditions that showed im-
provement under more generous coverage was hypertension control.
This finding suggests that an ideal insurance package would offer low-
cost coverage for hypertension control. On further examination of the
data, however, RAND researchers found that the effect of insurance
was primarily on the initial identification of hypertension. Further-
more, this identification typically occurred during a visit for some other
reason. Targeting hypertension alone would likely have beenineffec-
tive in improving outcomes (Newhouse 1993).
The RAND experiment also examined the effect of cost sharing on
the use of services where medical care is likely to offer some benefit68 Glied
and in cases where no such benefit is expected. Researchers found that
cost sharing reduced the use of services equally in cases where medical
care might do good and in cases where medical care was unlikely to
prove effective. To the extent that people, and / or their physicians, do
not correctly assess the potential benefits of a visit for a particular
symptom, service use is likely to diverge from the optimum. In sum,
it appears difficult to design coverage so that it induces only beneficial
service use.
The RAND experiment showed that sensitivity to cost-sharing is re-
lated to income. Low-income people had lower baseline rates of service
use. Furthermore, among those with lower incomes, use of services
was relatively lower under the cost-sharing plans than it was among
those with higher incomes (Lohr et al. 1986). This result occurred de-
spite the fact that the out-of-pocket maximums in the RAND experi-
ment were income-related. Thus, lower-income people faced less total
out-of-pocket exposure than did higher-income groups. Service use
among lower-income people was reduced both for conditions that ben-
efit from medical treatment and for those that do not, and was reduced
more for children than for adults (Lohr et al. 1986). The RAND experi-
ment also showed that the most direct effect of cost-sharing is on initial
care-seeking behavior. Once people had decided to go to the doctor, the
consequent pattern of care was less strongly affected by cost-sharing
(Newhouse 1993).
The RAND experiment suggested that cost-sharing for low-income
people has different effects than for higher-income people, but the re-
sults do not directly indicate how optimal coverage would differ for
the two groups. One possible goal would be to combine efficiency in
coverage design with equity in health service access. This goal would
imply identifying optimal coverage (balancing moral hazard and risk
protection) for nonsubsidized purchasers and designing a coverage
package for expansions that would generate the same level of health
service use among subsidized purchasers.
Estimates based on the RAND experiment suggest that optimal cov-
erage for people with average income would have about 50 percent
cost sharing and no stop loss (Manning and Marquis 1996). Table 3.6
uses the RAND data to indicate patterns of physician visit use by cost-
sharing arrangement for high- and low-income people. I also report
estimates on medical visits from the MEPS. The MEPS data are quite
consistent with the RAND results for the poor and near-poor popula-
tions. Combining the information from Manning and Marquis and theHealth Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 69
Table 3.6





















































































































State limit (parents)Bankruptcy asset exemptions
Oregon $10,000b $42,000d
Pennsylvania None $300'
Rhode Island None $1,300n1
South Carolina $2,500 $9,200ni
South Dakota $2,000 Unlimited homestead, $4,200 other property
Tennessee $2,000 $9,000"





West Virginia $1,000 $6,600"
Wisconsin $1,000 $47,200d
Wyoming $2,500 $15,000d
Source: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, April2001 and Debtcontrol
.com (http: / /www.debtcontrol.com/EXEMPTI.htm).
'Limit for recipients, applicant limit is lower.
bLimit for Job Opportunities and Basic Skifis Training program applicants, Aid to Depen-
dent Children limit is lower.
'Household goods exemption.
dAdditional exemptions for retirement accounts.
and elderly persons receive additional exemptions.
'Extra exemptions per dependent.
Note: In many states, public employees and teachers have special pension exemptions
from bankruptcy not listed here.
information in table 3.7 suggests that, if the policy goal is equity in
health service access, initial cost-sharing should be between 0 and 25
percent.
In the RAND experiment, everyone had complete coverage beyond
a deductible. By contrast, while uninsured people may receive some
uncompensated care, there is no reason to believe that they have full
coverage for catastrophic illnesses. Several studies show that patients
who are uninsured, or who hold Medicaid as their primary source of
coverage, lack access to technologically advanced care, suggesting that
the extent and nature of coverage also matters for high-cost care (see,
for example, Hadley, Steinberg, and Feder 1991; Glied 2002). Doyle



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































than do those with coverage and are more likely to die as a conse-
quence of their injuries. To the extent that the goal of health insurance
expansions is to increase health service use, these findings suggest that
expansions must also consider the nature of the catastrophic protection
provided.
Protection Against Bankruptcy
A second reason that we might want to provide people with health
insurance is to reduce the extent of personal bankruptcy. Many people
who declare bankruptcy report medical debts (Jacoby, Sullivan, and
Warren 2001). Personal bankruptcy legislation provides all Americans
with an implicit system of wealth insurance (Rea 1984; Wang and
White 2000). Since unanticipated adverse events can occur, people
would prefer to buy wealth coverage, but such coverage is unlikely to
be provided by the private market (Wang and White 2000). The exis-
tence of a set of bankruptcy rulesa public wealth insurance system
is thus beneficial to risk-averse consumers. Bankruptcy, however,
provides this insurance at a price. Consumers pay significantly higher
interest rates as the generosity of asset protection in bankruptcy in-
creases (Gropp, Scholz, and White 1997). Since the probability of an
adverse event is unlikely to be correlated with the generosity of asset
protection under a state's bankruptcy laws, this increase in interest
rates suggests that bankruptcy can induce substantial moral hazard.
One type of adverse event that may trigger bankruptcy is an unantic-
ipated accident or illness. Properly designed health insurance may pro-
vide more efficient protection against the financial consequences of
such unanticipated medical events than general bankruptcy protection
does. If so, subsidizing health insurance coverage for low-income
adults could improve social welfare. If the goal of coverage is to im-
prove the efficiency of wealth protection, insurance benefits provided
under expansions should be designed to minimize increases in ser-
vice use.
Different types of coverage offer different levels of protection against
bankruptcy. Private coverage typically incorporates limits on the
amount an individual need pay out-of-pocket, but these limits vary
among policies. Private coverage also generally, includes an annual
(and sometimes lifetime) maximum coverage limit. Under Medicaid,
out-of-pocket expenses are minimal, and there is no annual maxi-
mum coverage limit. Despite this generous design, Medicaid providesHealth Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 73
limited asset protection to adults in most states. As table 3.6 shows, in
all but a handful of states, asset limits for Medicaid coverage are well
below the level of protection granted under state bankruptcy laws.
If the purpose of extending insurance coverage is to substitute for
bankruptcy asset protection, then the level of that coverage should de-
pend on the quantity of assets to be protected. As is well known, most
uninsured people have low incomes (Ferry et al. 2002). Less informa-
tion is available on the assets of uninsured people. I examined data
from the 1998 Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD) (a follow-up to the
SIPP; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002) to assess the extent and nature
of assets held by uninsured people. Table 3.8 shows asset holdings for
uninsured (and privately insured) people with incomes below and
above 200 percent FPL. As the table suggests, asset holding among
uninsured people is also quite low. Only 40 percent of uninsured peo-
ple own homes. Most have mortgages on their homes (the SPD does
not provide information on outstanding mortgage amounts). Three-
fourths of uninsured adults do own cars, but the average value of cars
owned by uninsured people (net of outstanding loans) is only $2,586.
Relatively few uninsured people own other assets and most have debts.
Indeed, 52 percent of uninsured adults with incomes below 200 percent
FPL have a zero or negative net worth, excluding their home.
This pattern of asset ownership suggests that if the only goal of
health insurance is to serve as a substitute for bankruptcy protection,
it will have relatively little impact on the low-income uninsured (many
in this group have no assets to shield). About 78 percent of uninsured
adults with incomes below 200 percent FPL have net assets (excluding
home ownership) low enough to meet median Medicaid asset limit
guidelines ($2,000). Of this group, fewer than 40 percent own a home.
Publicly funded health insurance, however, may or may not be a more
efficient way to pay their medical debts than hospital uncompensated
care pools.
Health insurance may be more effective as a bankruptcy alternative
for slightly higher-income adults. About half of this group owns a
home. Even in this group, however, only 28 percent exceed average
Medicaid asset limits, excluding the value of their home.
V.Coverage Content and Insurance Expansions: A Simulation
The results above suggest that the content of coverage is likely to affect
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use and asset protection. To assess the magnitude of these effects for
potential coverage designs, I conducted a simulation exercise.
Using the 1996 MEPS, supplemented by asset data imputed from the
SPD, I constructed a description of health service use and spending
among uninsured people with incomes below (and above) 200 percent
FPL. I focus on five aspects of health service use and spending: the
level of spending, the variance of spending, the share of people with
at least one physician visit, the number of physician visits, and the
number of people with positive assets. Beginning with this baseline, I
then simulate the effect of giving each person in this population cover-
age with specific characteristics. Based on this simulation, I evaluate
alternative coverage policies in terms of their (1) insurance value to the
newly insured person, (2) health spending value to the newly insured
person, (3) reduction in bankruptcy, (4) effect on physician visits, and
(5) residual uncompensated care.
Simulation Methodology
To conduct this simulation, I first match MEPS data on utilization
among the full-year uninsured to data on asset ownership from the
Survey of Program Dynamics, using common covariates to match.
Next, I use the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) data to esti-
mate the probabilities of service use under each RAND fee-for-service
health plan type (defined by cost-sharing only). All data are for the
non-elderly adult population, age 19 to 64. (All simulations are con-
ducted separately for the population with incomes below and above
200 percent FPL because service use responsiveness and asset holdings
are quite different in these two populations.)
I encounter two problems in using the RAND HIE data in this way.
First, these data were collected over twenty years ago. Although sev-
eral more recent studies suggest that the relative effects of cost-sharing
on service utilization patterns have not changed in that interval, overall
patterns of service use certainly have. A comparison of the RAND data
and the MEPS shows, in particular, that use of inpatient care has de-
clined substantially, while use of pharmaceutical care has increased.
Physician service use patterns have not changed much.
Second, the RAND data do not include a group that is completely
uninsured. Even after adjusting for health status and demographics,
uninsured people in the 1996 MEPS use fewer services (of all types)
than do those with a 95 percent cost-sharing plan in the RAND HIE.76 Glied
To address these problems, I report two sets of results below. In one
set of results, I adjust the RAND 95 percent cost-sharing results to a
baseline of current use by the uninsured. I then apply relative increases
in service use, adjusted for health status and demographics, from that
baseline using the RAND data. Thus, where the RAND data show that
physician visits under a 50 percent cost-sharing plan are 16 percent
greater than under a 95 percent cost-sharing plan, I increase average
visits from the uninsured baseline by 16 percent. Then, I produce esti-
mates from the RAND FilE of the effect of cost-sharing on the log of
the level of use conditional on use for each type of service use. I adjust
the RAND figures using the ratio of medical expenditures per capita
in 1996 to that in 1980. I map the distribution of expenditure change
conditional on use onto the MEPS.
Finally, I apply a 20 percent correction to all service use above 80
percent of $2,000 (or the plan specific out-of-pocket maximum, as appli-
cable) up to the benefit maximum, to account for increased service use
among the uninsured above the RAND maximum dollar exposure
limit. I use the 20 percent figure to accord with Doyle's (2001) estimate
of the effect of being uninsured on unanticipated hospital service use.
Note that this figure is considerably lower than that computed by Man-
fling and Marquis (1996) and based on the RAND results. Those figures
do not take into account the provision of uncompensated care.
These corrections adjust the MEPS / RAND match for changes in the
baseline and for utilization above the uncompensated care threshold.
They do not adjust the MEPS/RAND match for any increase in the
probability of service use among people insured with high-deductible
coverage. To test for the validity of this assumption, I examine the ef-
fects on the probability of service use of changing the maximum dollar
exposure under the 95 percent cost-sharing plan for low-income people
in the RAND experiment. I find no significant or substantial effect of
the maximum dollar exposure on the propensity to seek care. While
by no means conclusive, this result suggests that adding very-high-
deductible coverage is unlikely to affect the use of front-end care
substantially.
As an upper-bound check on the importance of this assumption, I
repeat the analysis treating the RAND 95 percent cost-sharing plan
(and other RAND plans) as a new high-deductible plan. I compare
baseline service use with actual service use under the RAND 95 percent
plan. Thus, I assume that, if given a 95 percent cost-sharing plan, unin-
sured people would increase their probabilities of service use to RANDHealth Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 77
levels. In these analyses, I do not further adjust service use above the
maximum dollar exposure levels. Note that these analyses do not ac-
count for changes in the pattern of care-seeking since the RAND experi-
ment took place.
Using both these simulation structures, I compute changes in the
aggregate and out-of-pocket expenditures of the MEPS sample popula-
tion. To account for the effect of the possibility of bankruptcy on the
variance of out-of-pocket expenditures, I truncate out-of-pocket expen-
ditures at 20 percent of income plus net worth plus $10,000.6 This esti-
mate of the out-of-pocket expenditures an individual might incur
without declaring bankruptcy is generous. It inflates the resulting vari-
ance of out-of-pocket spending figures, leading to higher insuranceval-
ues. Finally, I assume that people with health insurance lose access
to the sliding scale and free care services that they used before. This
assumption is supported by anecdotal discussions with hospital and
clinic managers.
I value additional medical spending paid by insurance at one-half
its cost and additional medical spending paid for out-of-pocket at its
cost. I compute the insurance value of coverage as the sum of the de-
cline in out-of-pocket spending and a constant relative risk aversion
adjusted reduction in the variance of out-of-pocket spending. I apply
a risk aversion parameter of 0.00024, at the midpoint of the range iden-
tified by Szpiro (1986) and comparable to the estimate used by Man-
ning and Marquis (1996). I conducted sensitivity tests around the risk
aversion parameter but found that using a larger parameter had little
effect on the pattern of results. I measure the total value of coverage as
the sum of the value of additional medical utilization and the insurance
value.
Effects on Take-Up
The method above generates population averages. To compute the ef-
fects of alternative benefit packages on the probability of take-up, I
must assess the value of each package to each individual in the data.
I assume that each person accurately projects her or his own average
expected medical spending and out-of-pocket spending. Each person
also gains an insurance benefit from the reduction in expected out-
of-pocket expense variation associated with an insurance plan. I then
calculate the percentage of uninsured people who would be any better
off, and $100 better off, by joining the plan than remaining uninsured.78 Glied
Results
Results of the simulation are reported in tables 3.9 and 3.10. The base-
line shows expenditures before coverage expansion. Note that existing
medical expenditures would lead to bankruptcy (under the definition
used here) for about 2.8 percent of the population. Table 3.11 presents
the results of the second type of simulation where RAND utilization
is assigned as a separate insurance plan.
The second row of tables 3.9 and 3.10 shows the effect of giving each
uninsured person a benefit package with a $1,000 deductible and a
$1,000,000 benefit maximum (note that this maximum is never binding
in the MEPS sample). This policy induces a small amount of additional
medical spending, entirely among those whose baseline spending ex-
ceeded 80 percent of the deductible. This policy also generates a small
increase in out-of-pocket spending (mainly because insured people no
longer have access to free care below the level of the deductible) and
a large decrease in the variance of out-of-pocket spending. For the plan
considered in row 2, the total value of coverage, the sum of the insur-
ance value and the value of added medical spending, was $108.
The $1,000 deductible plan led to a very slight increase in bankruptcy
rates in the target population because much of the increase in medical
spending was paid out-of-pocket. The plan did not affect the propor-
tion of patients with a physician visit because we assume that no one
will be motivated to use services for the first time with the high deduct-
ible. Eighty-two percent of the uninsured low-income population
would be better off with this plan than with no coverage, but only 8
percent of this population would obtain $100 of value from this plan.
The next two rows in the tables show similar results for plans with
larger deductibles. In this low-income population, plans with deduct-
ibles of $2,000 or more actually have a negative value from the perspec-
tive of the purchaser. They cover a few catastrophic expenses for those
who would have incurred them, but for many in this group, existing
bankruptcy protection would have addressed these costs. For the rest
of the population, the plans actually increase the probability of bank-
ruptcy by eliminating access to the uncompensated and charity care
safety net below the deductible. Note that under these policies, how-
ever, hospital uncompensated care expenditures would decline be-
cause bankruptcies due to medical expenses below the deductible





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The next row of each table examines the effect of a 25 percent copay-
ment policy without a deductible but with a $2,000 stop loss. This pol-
icy induces much more medical spending and is much more valuable
to purchasers. Almost everyone is better off with such a plan, and a
majority of the uninsured would value it above $100.
The next four rows show the effect of a front-end policy that offers
free care with varying benefit maximums. For this population, low-
ering the benefit maximum has little effect on the value of coverage.
Even a policy with a very low benefit maximum is worth more to unin-
sured people, under the assumptions used here, than one with a $1,000
deductible. Front-end loaded policies, however, increase the amount of
uncompensated care in the system relative to high-deductible policies.
The final row of each table shows the effect of a policy that excludes
coverage for prescription drugs. Lack of prescription drug coverage in
a free care policy reduces medical visits and drug use (Stabile 1999).
This policy has benefits to the uninsured roughly equal to those of a
policy that includes drug coverage but caps benefits at $10,000.
Table 3.10 reports similar results for the uninsured population with
incomes over 200 percent FPL. The patterns are quite similar, except
that the higher-deductible coverage has slightly greater value to this
population, and the benefit caps reduce the value of coverage much
more for this group. Bankruptcy is less common among the group over
200 percent FPL under all insurance plans.
The results in table 3.11 suggest that our assumption that high-
deductible plans do not induce up-front service use makes little differ-
ence to the pattern of results above. The increase in utilization under
the 95 percent cost-sharing RAND plan (equivalent to a $2,000 de-
ductible plan in tables 3.9 and 3.10), which takes place mainly
below the deductible, increases the value of the plan by about $160
relative to the base case results above. Under the assumption of in-
creased up-front service use, 19 percent of low-income uninsured
people would view the $2,000 deductible plan as worth $100 or
more.
This increase in service utilization similarly increases the value of
the other models in table 3.11 by a roughly equivalent amount. It also
leads to a substantial increase in the propensity to use medical services
relative to the baseline. The level of physician service use under free
care using the RAND-based estimates is over one-third higher than
under free care using the model in tables 3.9 and 3.10.Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage 83
VI.Conclusions
Prior research examining the effects of expanding health insurance cov-
erage has treated all coverage as equal. But all coverage is not equal
not from the perspective of uninsured people and not from the perspec-
tive of public policy.
If the financial and nonfinancial costs of taking up coverage are $100,
then the take-up rate for coverage offering unlimited free care would
be over eight times greater than that for coverage with a $1,000 deduct-
ible, for the current uninsured population with incomes below 200 per-
cent FPL. The estimates also suggest that something is not always
better than nothing. Depending on how uncompensated care and free
care systems treat people with high-deductible policies, low-income
uninsured people may actually be worse off by moving from no insur-
ance to high-deductible coverage.
Notes
Research supported in part by a grant from the Commonwealth Fund Taskforce on
Workable Solutions. Excellent research and programming assistance by Kathrine Jack is
gratefully acknowledged.
House Majority Leader Dick Armey and Representative Pete Stark, Washington Post,
June 18, 1999, A41.
See, for example, http: / /www.noridian.com/extranet/bank/ind /pdf/29301814.
pdf or http: / /www.bcbsnc.com/plans/blueadvantage/how.cfm or http: / /www.
health-irisure.com/cainsfaq.html.
Most studies of take-up decisions have examined coverage categorically. Many quali-
tative studies do address differences between public and private coverage (such as
stigma), but other distinctions are generally ignored.
Note that the share paid by the uninsured may misstate true financial exposure be-
cause providers may measure uncompensated care relative to list prices or, conversely,
prices paid by the uninsured may already incorporate discounts. Finally, uninsured peo-
ple who do not pay their health care bills may be subject to harassment by collection
agencies and may be forced into bankruptcy. We do not incorporate these nonfinancial
costs in the analysis below.
Practically speaking, the last is subsumed in the first two. It is part of the question
of whether health services can be provided more cost effectively by either increasing
preventive service use (to prevent more serious complications later) or by paying the
costs of hospital care through insurance rather than uncompensated care. Increasing pre-
ventive services means providing coverage that increases health service use, the first
goal. Paying costs through insurance means offering more financial protection, the sec-
ond goal. Note that given the difficulties in inducing take-up in a voluntary health insur-84 Glied
ance market, it seems unlikely that paying for hospital care through insurance rather
than direct payments to hospitals is cost effective.
6. The increase in expenditures based on Doyle (2001) is not applied to expenditures
beyond those covered by the plan.
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